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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to apply hypotheses derived from theories of legitimacy 
and distributive justice to patterns of stability in income distribution in Poland. The 
hypotheses specify conditions under which income differences become legitimated. The 
question about the conditions of legitimacy of the differences is especially interesting in the 
Polish context, given steady increase in the amount of inequality after 1989. Data from Polish 
General Social Survey are then used to see if the hypotheses are consistent with empirical 
observation. 
Introduction 
Unequal distribution of rewards in a group or collectivity raises questions as to what 
makes the distribution stable.
2 The stability of reward distribution is problematic because 
distribution of rewards is often highly correlated with distributions of other valued resources 
— such as power and influence — so that instability in the distribution of rewards may 
contribute to instability in those other dimensions of stratification (Walker and Zelditch, 
1993). For instance, if citizens of a country find income distribution unfair, they are likely to 
voice their discontent in election by voting for a party which promises to make the income 
distribution more fair by means of certain adjustments in the fiscal policy, for example. 
                                                 
1 The present paper is an extended and revised version of the presentation I gave in School for 
Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) at University College London in December 
2009 as part of Research Seminar Series. Remarks and questions raised by participants in that 
seminar are hereby gratefully acknowledged. I owe special thanks to Professor Tomasz 
Mickiewicz who commented on earlier drafts of this paper. Much of the research reported in 
this paper was completed during my stay as a Honorary Research Fellow in SSEES from 
October to December 2009, within the Visiting Scholar Scheme established by SSEES and 
the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. I hereby thank 
both institutions for providing me with this opportunity. Direct all correspondence to: Institute 
of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 72 Nowy Swiat Street, 00-
330 Warsaw, Poland, zkarpinski@ifispan.waw.pl.  
2 Actually, this question could be raised with respect to any distribution of a valued good, 
whether it's equal or not. The stability of an equal distribution is not, by itself, obvious and 
natural. Therefore, those in positions of power and influence have an interest in making distribution of 
rewards more or less stable. 
Throughout the paper, the stability of income distribution is conceptualised in terms of 
attempts to change the distribution: if any such attempts are made, then the distribution is 
subject to instability. It is the lack of such attempts that make it stable. Instability of the 
income structure, therefore, means (a) tensions attributed by members of a collectivity to its 
income structure, (b) pressures to change the structure, created by those tensions, and (c) 
actual change due to these pressures.
3 
Stability of reward distributions figures prominently in sociological theories of 
legitimacy and distributive justice (Hegtvedt, 2006; Zelditch, 2001). More precisely, 
legitimacy theories are concerned with the question of stability of social structures of various 
kinds of which the reward distribution is just one example (Hegtvedt, 2006; Zelditch, 2001; 
2006). In legitimacy theories, the problem is how legitimacy of a pre-given social order 
spreads to its new or contested elements (Zelditch and Walker, 2003) and how, given 
legitimacy, various elements of the social order become stable (Zelditch and Walker, 1984). 
As regards the theories of distributive justice, in turn, reward distributions are stable to the 
extent they match or satisfy a norm of fair distribution (Hegtvedt, 2006). Research has shown, 
however, that reactions to injustice are driven not only by those normative considerations, but 
by other factors, such as self-interest and perceptual bias, as well (Jasso and Rossi, 1977; 
Shepelak and Alwin, 1986). 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the patterns of stability of income 
distribution in Poland after the fall of communism to see if the patterns are consistent with 
expectations based on theories of legitimacy and distributive justice. The stability of income 
distribution is operationalised here in terms of responses to a survey item concerning 
preferences for reduction of income inequality. Ideally, the stability should be measured using 
behavioural indicators, but such indicators are impossible to obtain in a survey study. Another 
limitation of the empirical material used in this paper is that not all of the items employed as 
instantiations of important theoretical concepts are available for the whole period of interest, 
that is, the period 1992-2008. Therefore, the analysis has to be restricted in time. Finally, the 
paper deals exclusively with the issues concerning the distribution of income and says nothing 
about the means or procedures by which the income is distributed. Put differently, the paper is 
                                                 
3 This conceptualisation of stability of income distribution builds upon the notion of stability 
of power structure, as developed by theory of legitimacy; see Zelditch (2006) and Zelditch 
and Walker (1984) for details. concerned with issues pertaining to distributive justice rather than procedural justice 
(Törnblom and Vermunt, 2007). 
The paper is divided into four main sections. In the first one, the theoretical 
background is overviewed and crucial theoretical relationships are presented. The second 
section is concerned with operationalisation of the theoretical concepts in terms of indicators 
based on responses to survey items and with formulation of a set of hypotheses to be tested. 
The third section discusses statistical tools and empirical material used to test the hypotheses. 
Finally, a short summary of the research reported in this paper and some conclusions 
concerning further research on the topic are proposed in the closing section. 
 
The conceptual background 
The increase in the amount of income inequality in Poland in the 1990s is a well-
known and well-established fact, even though the estimates of the amount of that increase 
differ depending on the source of data. For instance, Table 1 reports values of the Gini 
coefficient of concentration, compiled by (Kumor, 2009) on the basis of empirical material 
provided by the Central Statistical Office in Poland. Gini coefficient is commonly used to 
measure inequality in income, especially in cross-national research, because of its desired 
property of scale invariance (Allison, 1978; Sen, 1973). The Gini coefficient is bounded 
between 0 and 1, with the lower bound indicating perfect equality (when every member of a 
community has the same amount of a valued good, such as income) and the upper bound 
indicating maximum inequality (when one member of the community is in possession of the 
whole good, while the remaining members have nothing). Other properties of the Gini 
coefficient are presented elsewhere (Allison, 1978; Sen, 1973). The figures in Table 1 indicate 
how much inequality there was in monthly wages of Polish employees between the years 
1987 and 2006. As we can see, the inequality grew constantly throughout the 1990s and 
continued to grow after 2000. Most of the time, the increase in inequality seems to have been 
steady, except for two time points — 1989-1991 and 1993-1994 — when it was more rapid. 
In general, the inequality in earnings increased by some 44 per cent in the period 1988-1999.  
Along with this increase in the amount of income inequality, respondents’ opinions 
regarding the inequality tended to converge on the idea that there was too much inequality in 
income. Specifically, Table 2 shows distributions (in percentages) of responses to an item 
asking the subjects if they agreed with the statement that income differences in Poland were 
too large. The figures are based on data from the Polish General Social Survey, an on-going research project which is described in more detail in a later section. As one can see from the 
table, the percentage of those who replied ‘Strongly agree’ to that item went up, while the 
remaining percentages went down in the period under study, although the trends are not 
monotonic. Interestingly, the proportion of respondents indicating ‘strong agreement’ with the 
quoted statement increased by 57 per cent — from less than forty per cent to more than sixty 
per cent — between 1992 and 2008. Further, the cumulative percentages of the subjects 
replying ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’ went up by more than ten percentage points, reaching 
90.9 per cent in 2008. Also, note that there was a decline in the relative frequency of ‘Don’t 
know’ responses, suggesting that the problem of income differences grew in importance for 
the participants in the Survey. Either way, popular perceptions of income differences in 
Poland seem to have converged on the idea that there was too much inequality in the way 
income was distributed. That is, the income differences, as perceived by the Polish 
respondents, exceeded the level they would be willing to accept or justify as fair. 
Experience of injustice and reactions to it 
Departure of the actual distribution of rewards from the just one gives rise to 
experience of injustice which, in turn, produces a feeling of distress that calls for some action 
to restore justice, either cognitively or behaviourally.
4 As to the behavioural reactions to 
injustice, a person may attempt to redress the injustice he or she experiences by changing his 
or her actual inputs (contributions) or his or her actual outcomes. For instance, an over-
rewarded person, feeling guilt because of having received more for his or her contributions 
than he or she deserves (or more than other persons with similar inputs), is motivated to 
reduce the guilt by increasing his or her productivity or compensating the under-rewarded. 
Similarly, an under-rewarded person, feeling anger because of having received less for his or 
her contributions than he or she deserves (or less than other group members with similar 
inputs), is motivated to relieve the anger by decreasing his or her productivity or 
                                                 
4 For a general overview of sociological theory and research on distributive justice, see Cook 
and Hegtvedt (1983), Hegtvedt (1994; 2006), Hegtvedt and Johnson (2000) and Hegtvedt and 
Markovsky (1995). Distributive justice refers to outcomes of a process by which rewards (and 
punishments) are distributed among members of a group. Another important field of 
sociological study on justice concerns procedural justice, fairness in the means by which the 
distribution decisions are made (for a comprehensive discussion of both areas of theory and 
research, consult Törnblom and Vermunt, 2007). Although findings from a recent experiment 
confirm that procedures matter (Molm, Takahashi, and Petersen, 2003), procedural 
considerations are omitted in this paper and the focus is exclusively on the distributive issues. 
It is largely due to lack of appropriate empirical material with which to test hypotheses 
concerning procedural justice. compensating the under-reward with a greater share of some other reward, if available.
5 When 
the individual feelings of injustice are accompanied by recognition that there are other group 
members who are treated unfairly, collective action to restore justice — in the form of strikes, 
boycotts, political rebellion, and the like — is likely to emerge (Hegtvedt, 1994; Walker and 
Zelditch, 1993). 
Note, however, that the lack of response to justice evaluation does not necessarily 
mean that the subject has felt no injustice. The likelihood of the response depends, among 
other things, upon ascriptions of responsibility for the injustice. Persons who attribute the 
responsibility to another person (or persons) are more likely to seek redress than those who 
attribute the responsibility to chance or some other impersonal factors (Utne and Kidd, 1980). 
Thus, if an increase in income inequality beyond the acceptable level is seen as resulting from 
deliberate action of persons or groups who benefit from it, collective response by persons 
distressed by the increase in inequality are more likely to follow than if the increase is 
attributed to some impersonal forces such as operation of the market or changes in the 
demographic structure. 
Another factor that affects reactions to injustice is self-interest. Much of the evidence 
concerning the effect of self-interest on the perception of justice comes from laboratory 
studies using exchange networks. Results of these experiments show that subjects at power-
advantaged positions perceive exchange outcomes as more fair than those occupying power-
disadvantaged positions (Cook, Hegdtvedt, and Yamagishi, 1988); that social actors evaluate 
their contributions as more important than the contributions of others; and that actors who 
perform well on a task tend to prefer equity as a just distribution rule, while those who 
perform poorly tend to prefer equality (Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983). Findings from survey 
studies tell a similar story. The perceived justice of income distributions is positively related 
to individual income (Shepelak and Alwin, 1986) and people prefer distribution rules that 
serve their own interests (Jasso and Rossi, 1977). 
Inequality and legitimacy 
But reward distributions can remain stable — in the sense that no action is taken to 
change them — even if they violate individual feelings of justice, provided that the 
distributions are collectively legitimated (Walker and Zelditch, 1993). There are a number of 
sociological theories of legitimacy (Zelditch, 2001, and the present discussion builds on ideas 
from one of them, that is, from legitimacy theory as developed by Henry A. Walker and 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of research testing these conjectures, see Hegtvedt (1994: 194-5). Morris Zelditch (Walker and Zelditch, 1993; Zelditch, 2006; Zelditch and Walker, 1984; 
2000; 2003).  
Following Dornbusch and Scott (1975), Zelditch and Walker distinguish between 
individually accepted and collectively established legitimacy. The former is referred to as 
propriety and it means an individual belief that an element of a social order — such as an 
institution, practice, position, or structure — is right or the way it ought to be (Walker and 
Zelditch 1993; Zelditch, 2006). It is argued that, ceteris paribus, propriety guides individual 
actions, so that impropriety should lead to actions aimed at changing the existing order or 
some element of it (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975). But the theory also claims that propriety is 
neither necessary, nor sufficient condition of legitimacy, because legitimation processes are 
inherently collective (Zelditch, 2006). The collectively established legitimacy is termed 
validity and the relevant hypothesis is that a structure that is improper can remain stable if it is 
collectively validated (Walker and Zelditch, 1993; Zelditch and Walker, 1984).  Collective 
validation of social structures establishes a framework for meaningful and socially sanctioned 
behaviour. Validity of the structure imposes direct pressures on members of the group to 
comply with established institutions (Thomas, Walker, and Zelditch, 1986). If a social 
structure is valid, members of the group are expected to act so as to maintain the structure, to 
approve of actions that maintain the structure and to disapprove of actions that challenge it. 
Also, in Zelditch-Walker theory validity is predicted to create indirect pressures on 
individuals through its effect on propriety in the sense that collectively validated social 
structures strengthen group members’ beliefs that the structures are proper (Zelditch, 2006; 
Zelditch and Walker, 1984; 2000). The theory’s predictions were largely supported by 
empirical tests using controlled laboratory settings and surveys (Mueller and Landsman, 
2004; Thomas, Walker, and Zelditch, 1986; Walker, Rogers, Thomas, and Zelditch, 1991; 
Walker, Rogers, and Zelditch, 1988; 2002; Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch, 1986; Zelditch and 
Walker 1984; 2000; 2003). 
Applying these ideas to the problem of legitimacy of inequality, personal opinions that 
‘income differences are too large’ can be taken to mean that the actual inequality departs from 
what it ought to be and for this reason is found improper. If propriety guides behaviour, as 
Zelditch-Walker theory claims it does, the belief that there is too much inequality should lead 
individuals to behaviour aiming at (or, at the very least, to expression of preference for) 
reducing the differences in income. Consequently, impropriety of the income inequality 
should translate into instability of the income distribution. But individuals are guided in their behaviour not only by their own sense of 
appropriateness, but also by their anticipation of the behaviour of others. If the others are 
expected to approve of the existing inequality in income, they can also be expected to act so 
as to maintain the inequality, to do nothing to challenge it and to disapprove of action 
challenging the distribution of income. But how do the others come to approve of the income 
distribution in the first place? This is where validity of the distribution comes into play. The 
distribution (and its properties, including inequality) becomes validated when it is linked to a 
larger social and cultural framework. More specifically, the income differences become 
validated if they (are believed to) serve an important societal goal, for instance, or if they (are 
believed to) derive from another element of a social order that is already validated, such as 
when the increase in the amount of inequality is seen as a consequence of necessary economic 
reforms. In the former case, the rule of income distribution, together with its resulting 
properties, including inequality, is legitimate because it is (seen as) instrumental to future 
prosperity which can be assumed to constitute an important social goal. Let us now turn 
attention to the latter case, in which legitimacy spreads from an element that already is 
legitimate to a new element of a social order.  
Support for pro-market reforms and the spread of legitimacy 
The increase in the amount of income inequality was commonly attributed to the 
economic reforms initiated by the first Polish non-communist government. One’s attitude 
towards the reforms — and the systemic change in 1989 more generally — could have 
coloured their attitude towards the increase in income inequality in the sense that endorsing 
the reforms could have resulted in acceptance of the level of the economic inequality as 
somewhat unpleasant but necessary ‘side effect’ of transition from communism to market 
economy. On the other hand, if a feeling of insecurity associated with rapid social changes led 
some subjects to oppose the reforms, this lack of support could have spread to their attitudes 
towards the economic inequality.  
The proposition concerning the effects of the support for the reforms initiated in 1989 
is not an ad hoc conjecture, but an instantiation of the spread-of-legitimacy hypothesis, as 
developed by Zelditch and Walker (2003). According to Zelditch and Walker theory, there are 
four conditions of legitimacy of a social order
6 and the spread-of-legitimacy hypothesis 
                                                 
6 The four conditions in question are consensus, impartiality, objectification, and consonance. 
In Zelditch-Walker theory of legitimacy, legitimacy cannot be created out of nothing, which 
is to say that for a new element of a social order to acquire legitimacy, some other elements, claims that if all of the four conditions are satisfied, then legitimacy spreads from those 
elements of the social order that are already legitimated to any elements of the order to which 
the accepted elements are linked (Zelditch and Walker, 2003, p. 223, 235-239). From this 
point of view, the legitimacy of the first non-communist Polish government spreads to the 
pro-market reforms it initiated and, to the extent that the increase in income inequality is seen 
as a consequence of these reforms — to the extent, that is, that the increase can be linked to 
these reforms — the actual income inequality is likely to become legitimated and, therefore, 
stable. 
Summary 
To summarise the discussion so far, the present analysis builds on concepts and 
relationships developed by theories of legitimacy and distributive justice. Specifically, the 
two theories share an interest in the stability of social structures of various kinds: theory of 
distributive justice is concerned with stability of distribution of rewards (and burdens), while 
legitimacy theory is interested in stability of structures of authority or status. Further, both 
theories ask what makes the various social structures more or less stable. This question is a 
major focus in this paper as well. 
 
From the distributive-justice theoretical framework, the following notions are taken: 
(a) Departure of the actual income distribution of income from the expectations based on 
some normative standard results on an experience of injustice, (b) the experience of injustice 
calls for some reaction, behavioural or cognitive, in order to restore the sense of justice, and 
\item the behavioural reaction against injustice can be suppressed by attributions of 
responsibility for the injustice or by self-interest.  From legitimacy theory as well as 
experimental research on legitimacy of inequality, the present analysis borrows the following 
notions: (c) Legitimacy is a multi-level phenomenon, (d) both propriety and validity 
contribute to the stability of a social order, but validity is more important of the two: the order 
                                                                                                                                                          
such as norms, values, practices, and the like, have to be already legitimated and there must 
be a ‘formula’ linking those ‘undefined’ or ‘contested’ elements of the social order to the 
accepted. Consensus means that the elements to which the formula appeals are consensually 
accepted. Impartiality means that any benefit to which the formula appeals is in the group 
interest. Objectification means that any belief to which the formula appeals is a matter of 
objective fact. Finally, consonance means that the elements of the social order that are 
accepted as legitimate are consonant with the nature of the order. For a detailed discussion of 
these conditions and their ‘corollaries’, as well as experimental research testing them, see 
Zelditch and Walker (2003). that is seen as improper can remain stable if it is collectively validated, and (e) legitimacy can 
spread from an approved element of a social order to a new, or contested, element of that 
order. Let us now turn to operationalisation of the key concepts. 
 
Data, measures, and hypotheses 
The source of data 
The present analysis makes use of data of the Polish General Social Survey, or PGSS 
for short, (Cichomski, Jerzyński and Zieliński, 2009a), an on-going research program initiated 
in the early 1990s in order to track changes taking place in the actual structure of the Polish 
society, in its social consciousness as well as in Poles’ attitudes towards a number of social, 
economic, and political issues. Initially, that is from 1992 to 1995, the Survey was carried out 
every year, but after this period the intervals were extended to two and, eventually, three 
years. So far, nine editions of the Survey have been completed each of which was based on a 
probability sample of men and women aged 18 or more. Sample sizes varied from edition to 
edition, and so did completion rates, as shown in Table 3. 
In each edition of the PGSS, a standard questionnaire was used together with some 
additional thematic modules. Also, since the very beginning the PGSS has collaborated with 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), fielding some of its modules. Further 
information as to the goals of the PGSS, subject areas it covers, its data collection and 
processing methodology, ‘methodological experiments’ it performs, sampling design it uses, 
and many other issues can be obtained through the Survey’s website: 
http://pgss.iss.uw.edu.pl. Cichomski, Jerzynski, and Zielinski (2009b) provide a complete 
description of the Survey and its methodology.
7 Also, additional information on the 
characteristics of the PGSS and the sample is to be given in subsequent sections if 
appropriate. 
Measurement of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable is operationalised in terms of the questionnaire item, ‘The 
government should reduce income differences’. More specifically, participants in the PGSS 
were asked if they agreed with the quoted statement and their responses were coded using a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly agree’) to 5 (‘strongly disagree’). Agreement with the 
                                                 
7 The cited report was written in Polish, but an earlier version of it is available in English 
which was prepared after the 2002 edition of the PGSS has been completed; see (Cichomski, 
Jerzyński, and Zieliński, 2003) for details. statement may be seen as indicative of a preference for changing the way income in Poland is 
distributed. In turn, disagreement with the statement may be viewed as reflecting a preference 
for status quo in income distribution. 
In Zelditch-Walker theory, the interest is in how legitimacy affects stability of a social 
order (Zelditch and Walker, 1984). Similarly, the present analysis investigates the effects of 
income inequality on the frequency of occurrence of the preference for status quo. The 
original 5-point Likert scale has therefore been transformed into a binary response assigning 1 
to those subjects who indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the 
government should reduce the income differences, and 0 otherwise; ‘Don’t know’ responses 
were classified as missing data in the present analysis. 
In other words, expressing the preference for status quo in the income distribution is 
treated here as a ‘success’ in a Bernoulli process, and logistic regression for dichotomous 
variables (Agresti, 2002, ch. 5) is used to assess the effects of explanatory factors, listed in the 
following subsection, on the odds of success. 
Because the present analysis uses survey data to represent key theoretical concepts, it 
is impossible to obtain ‘true’ behavioural measures of the attempts to change the income 
structure, the dependent variable in Zelditch-Walker theory of legitimacy. Instead, this 
analysis relies on subjects’ opinions and beliefs, as communicated in response to relevant 
questionnaire items, to capture their attitudes towards changing the income distribution. But 
opinions and beliefs are very imperfect indicators (or predictors) of readiness to engage in 
action aiming at changing the income distribution in Poland, because — as decades of social 
psychological research and theorising on attitudes have shown — there is usually only vary 
weak relationship between attitude and behaviour (Kraus, 1995; Schuman, 1995).  
Furthermore, the participants in the PGSS were not asked whether they themselves 
would be willing to join the action aiming at reducing the income inequality in Poland, but if 
they thought that the differences in income should be reduced by a third party, which 
contributes further to the imperfectness of the chosen indicator as a predictor of behaviour. 
After all, it is easier to tell others what to do than to do it oneself (Heckathorn, 2002). 
Also, since the item explicitly indicates the government as the agent that should 
reduce the inequality in income distribution, it is possible that attitudes towards the 
government interact with the attitudes towards the inequality. 
And last but not least, there seems to be some ambiguity in the statement used to 
measure the subjects’ preference for changing the existing income distribution. On the one 
hand, it can be interpreted as saying that reducing the income differences should be among the government’s responsibilities. On the other hand, it can be taken to mean that the differences 
should be reduced because they are too large and only the government is powerful enough to 
do something about it. It is only in the case of the latter interpretation that we should expect a 
correlation between one’s attitude towards (preference for) reducing the income inequality 
and one’s actual behaviour in this regard. 
Independent variables: propriety and validity 
Let us now turn attention to explanatory variables. I begin with discussing 
operationalisation of two variables taken from legitimacy theory: propriety and validity. The 
former is measured with the questionnaire item, ‘The income differences in Poland are too 
large’. To agree with this statement is to say that the amount of income inequality in Poland 
exceeds the level that is found acceptable and the rule of income distribution that gives rise to 
this amount of inequality should be rejected as improper. On the other hand, to disagree with 
that statement is to say that the income differences in Poland are not above the level that is 
believed to be fair and so the rule of income distribution which gives rise to this amount of 
inequality should be accepted as proper.  
In order to measure validity, the following item was used: ‘Income differences are 
necessary for Poland’s future prosperity’. In this statement, the amount of income inequality 
is linked to a broader social framework defining socially accepted goals. To the extent that a 
person believes that income inequality is a condition of prosperity, they will expect others to 
accept the rule of distribution that gives rise to the amount of inequality and, consequently, by 
taking the others into account, the person will be less likely to express a preference for 
changing the distribution of income. By the same token, rejecting the view that income 
inequality is necessary for prosperity may be conducive to preference and, eventually, action 
to change the existing income distribution as invalid, i.e. as not being functional for 
realisation of important societal goals. 
In the PGSS questionnaire, responses to both items were coded using a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (‘Strongly agree’) to 5 (‘Strongly disagree’). In the present analysis, 
however, the original scales were transformed into binary ones. As regards the indicator of 
propriety, the score of 1 was assigned to the subjects who agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that the income differences in Poland were too large, and the score of 0 to those 
who replied otherwise. For this reason, responses to the statement, ‘Income differences in 
Poland are too large’, as coded for the purpose of this analysis, should be seen as an indicator 
of impropriety, rather than propriety, of income inequality. In the case of the indicator of validity, 1 is assigned to the subjects giving a ‘legitimating’ response and 0 to those giving a 
‘non-legitimating’ one, where the legitimating response consists in replying either ‘Agree’ or 
‘Strongly agree’ to the item, ‘Income differences are necessary for Poland’s future 
prosperity’. As in the case of the measure of the dependent variable, ‘Don’t know’ responses 
were classified as missing cases. 
Based on the previous discussion of the concepts of propriety and validity, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:  
Hypothesis 1 (the effects of impropriety): Ceteris paribus, subjects who think that differences 
in income in Poland are too large are more likely to agree with the statement that the 
government should reduce the differences than subjects who do not think that the 
inequality in income in Poland is too large.  
Hypothesis 2 (the effects of validity): Ceteris paribus, subjects who think that differences in 
income are necessary for Poland’s future prosperity are less likely to agree with the 
statement that the government should reduce the differences than subjects who think 
that the differences are not a necessary condition of future prosperity. 
Independent variables: support for the market reforms and self 
interest 
Let us now turn attention to the problem of measurement of the support for the 
political and economic reforms initiated in Poland in 1989. In the PGSS questionnaire, one 
question seems to be relevant to this point. Namely, the participants were asked if they 
thought that the changes begun in Poland in 1989 were advantageous or disadvantageous to 
most of Poles, with responses coded using a 5-point scale ranging from ‘Entirely 
advantageous’ to ‘Entirely disadvantageous’. If a person is of the opinion that the changes 
were in fact advantageous for most of Poles, he or she is likely to be supportive of the 
changes, including the political and economic reforms, and ready to accept their various 
consequences, including the increase in the amount of income inequality. In other words, it is 
assumed here that those who believe that the changes initiated in 1989 were advantageous for 
most people in Poland are likely to find the changes legitimate and extend this legitimacy to 
the characteristics of income distribution. 
Also, in order to avoid the interpretation that the subjects think that the political and 
economic changes in Poland were advantageous for most of the Polish society, because the 
changes were advantageous for the respondents personally, another item is included in the 
present analysis — one that asks the subjects if they thought that the changes set out in Poland in 1989 were advantageous to them and their families, with responses coded using the same 
scale as the previous one. Thus, it is possible to investigate the effect of the support for the 
political and economic changes in Poland on the preference for reducing the income 
differences, regardless of whether the changes were or were not advantageous to the given 
person. For the sake of the present analysis, both items were transformed into binary 
responses with 1 given to the subjects who thought that the changes were advantageous — 
that is, to the subjects who selected 1 (‘Entirely advantageous’) or 2 (‘More advantageous 
than disadvantageous’) on the original scale — and the remaining respondents were assigned 
0. The ‘Don’t know’ responses were recoded as missing cases. 
As regards the support for the reforms, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3 ( the effect of support for the democratic and economic reforms): Ceteris 
paribus, subjects who think that the reforms initiated in Poland in 1989 were 
advantageous to most of the Polish society are less likely to agree with the statement 
that the government should reduce the differences in income as compared to subjects 
who think that the reforms were disadvantageous to most Poles. 
Note, however, that the second item, the one asking how the 1989 reforms affected the 
subjects and their families, is introduced in this analysis not only as a control variable, but 
also for substantive reasons, as an operationalisation of the concept of self-interest. That is, 
the assumption here is that if a person claims that the reforms had a positive effect on the 
person’s situation, he or she has an interest in supporting the reforms as well as its effects 
(real or imagined), including the increase in the amount of inequality. In other words, if a 
person finds the effects of the reforms advantageous for self and his or her family, that person 
is less likely to question the results of those reforms and more likely to support the status quo 
in the way income is distributed in Poland. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4 (the effects of self-interest): Ceteris paribus, subjects who think that the reforms 
initiated in Poland in 1989 were advantageous to them personally are less likely to 
agree with the statement that the government should reduce the differences in income 
as compared to subjects who think that the reforms were disadvantageous to them and 
their families. 
Independent variable: attribution of responsibility for injustice 
The PGSS data were not collected for the purpose of testing a particular sociological 
theory or hypothesis, it is therefore somewhat difficult to find a direct indicator of whom the 
subjects attribute the responsibility to for the unjustifiable increase in the income inequality. Fortunately, however, the Social Inequality module contains a number of questions asking the 
subjects their opinion on income inequality. Among them is an item that could well be used as 
a measure of the ascription of responsibility for the increase in inequality. The item reads, 
‘Inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and powerful’. If inequality is seen 
to serve the interests of those who are rich and powerful (presumably, at the cost to the other 
groups in the society), then it is precisely this group that should be held responsible for the 
unjustifiable increase in the amount of income inequality. Hence, agreement with this 
statement is taken to mean that the responsibility is attributed to a particular group of people, 
while the lack of such agreement means that this responsibility is ascribed to impersonal 
forces. 
This interpretation, however, is not without flaws: even if a person does not agree with 
the quoted statement, he or she may still believe some groups are responsible for the unjust 
increase in inequality, even if the group in question are not composed of the rich and 
powerful. Also, even if a person believes that the rich and powerful do benefit from the 
inequality, it does not necessarily mean that this person finds it improper or unfair. Therefore, 
in order to improve somewhat the measurement of the concept of attribution of responsibility, 
the following modification is proposed. A binary response is used to operationalise this 
concept, with 1 assigned to those subjects who believe that the income differences are too 
large and that the inequality benefits the rich and powerful, because it is such subjects that can 
be thought of as ‘blaming’ the inequality on the rich and powerful. Future research should 
nevertheless seek to refine the measurement of the attribution of responsibility for injustice. 
In regard to the effects of attribution of responsibility, the following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
Hypothesis 5 (the effect of the attribution of responsibility for injustice): Ceteris paribus, 
subjects who attribute the unjust increase in income inequality in Poland to the rich 
and powerful — in the sense that they think inequality in income in Poland is too large 
and it benefits the rich and powerful — are more likely to agree with the statement 
that the government should reduce the inequality than subjects who do not share that 
view. 
Control variables 
Finally, there is a set of variables which, presumably, can be expected to affect the 
dependent variable, but are of no substantive interest here and are included in the model only 
as controls. The variables in question are: age, gender, household income per capita, the degree of education, social-occupational category, economic sector, region of residence, and 
size of the town of residence. Age is measured in the number of years. Gender is coded 1 for 
male and 0 for female. As regards education, five degrees are distinguished: primary or lower; 
basic vocational or incomplete secondary (hereafter, lower secondary); completed secondary 
education, either vocational or comprehensive (hereafter, upper secondary); post-secondary, 
non tertiary; and higher education. The lowest level of education, primary or lower, is a 
reference category. Social-occupational category is based on a truncated variant of the 
classification of occupations devised by Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne 
Portocarrero (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) and it comprises six categories: service class; 
routine non-manual workers; small proprietors; skilled manual workers; unskilled manual 
workers; and farmers and farm labourers. In the logistic-regression analysis, service class is 
used as a reference category. As for the economic sector, eleven categories were 
distinguished, depending on the form of ownership. The variable size of the place of residence 
takes on eight values ranging from ‘rural community’ (reference category) to ‘a city with 
500,000 or more residents’. And, finally, there are eight geographic regions. No specific 
hypotheses for the control variables are formulated. 
One additional variable is included in the analysis, namely, year. It is defined as a 
nominal variable, with nine categories, one for each edition of the PGSS. The variable is 
added to the model so as to study time effects, if any, that is to investigate if there are any 
significant differences, with respect to the preferences for status quo vs. changes in the 
distribution of income, between participants in different editions of the PGSS. 
 
Results of the analysis 
Let me begin by pointing out to some limitations of the empirical material used in this 
analysis. While the PGSS has been conducted since 1992 and its database now covers the 
period 1992-2008, this doesn’t hold for all the variables in the data set or items in the main 
PGSS questionnaire. Specifically, several of the key items selected for the purpose of this 
analysis — the ones asking whether the changes initiated in 1989 were or were not 
advantageous for most of the Polish society — were incorporated into the questionnaire in 
1997 and had not been given to the participants in the earlier editions of the Survey. For this 
reason, the first four rounds of the PGSS are not included in this analysis, which reduces the 
size of the data set from the original 16,234 cases to 9,726 cases.  Further reduction in the size of the data set results from the fact that the items ‘Income 
differences are necessary for Poland’s future prosperity’ and ‘Inequality continues to exist 
because it benefits the rich and powerful’ were asked to the respondents not as a part of the 
basic questionnaire, but as a part of the special ISSP module Social Inequality fielded in 1992 
and 1999. Because the data for 1992 were already excluded for reasons described earlier, it 
means that logistic-regression models with variables based on these items as explanatory 
factors would have to be limited to the 1999 sub-sample comprising only 1,135 cases. Hence, 
the analysis would focus on a single year and would not allow for investigation into time 
effects, if any, associated with respondents’ reactions towards inequality in income. 
Therefore, I made a decision to run two separate analyses: one, using the 9,726 cases from the 
1997-2008 editions of the PGSS, studying the effects of all the variables except for validity 
and attribution of responsibility for injustice, and the second analysis using the 1999 data and 
studying the effects of all the variable listed in the preceding section.  
In order to handle missing cases, list-wise deletion was applied to the data set, 
contributing further to sample attrition. The numbers of cases excluded due to missingness are 
reported below. 
The logistic-regression analysis reported in this section was performed in the R 
environment (R Development Core Team, 2009), using facilities provided by the package 
Zelig (Imai, King, and Lau, 2009; 2010). Specifically, this analysis employs the model 
logit.survey (Carnes, 2007) which allows for fitting logistic-regression models for 
dichotomous dependent variables to survey-weighted data. 
Fitting model I: the effects of impropriety, self-interest, and spread 
of legitimacy 
We now turn attention to the results of fitting the first of the two models to be 
reviewed in this section. I will begin by introducing a bit of notation. Let P(Y=1) mean the 
probability of success, or replying in the affirmative to the question, ‘Should the government 
reduce the income differences?’ In turn, the ratio P(Y=1)/[1 – P(Y=1)] is the odds of success, 
that is, the odds of replying affirmatively rather than negatively to that question. Finally, 
natural logarithm of the odds, called the logit of P(Y=1), is the dependent variable in logistic-
regression to be estimated in this analysis. More precisely, the first of these models is given 
by the following equation: 
ln
PY=1 ( )
1−PY=1 ()
=α +β1Impr+β2Support+β3Self +β4Year+β5Contr,( 1 )  where Impr stands for the indicator of impropriety, Support denotes the measure of support 
for the pro-market reforms initiated in Poland in 1989, and Self is the indicator of self-interest, 
as defined in the previous section. Year is a set of dummy variables representing consecutive 
editions of the PGSS, with the 1997 edition as the reference category and Contr represents 
the vector of control variables. Throughout this section, only the estimates of the effects of the 
substantive variables are presented in tables and discussed, however. 
Table 4 provides estimates of the effects of the independent variables in model (1) on 
the natural logarithm of the odds of success. Because interpretation of the effects in terms of 
natural logarithm may seem somewhat unnatural and difficult to grasp, the estimates are 
exponentiated so they specify the effects of the variables on the odds of success rather than on 
its natural logarithm. Thus, the estimated effect of impropriety means that, ceteris paribus, 
subjects who think that income differences in Poland are too large are e
1.807=6.092 times more 
likely to indicate that the government should reduce the income differences than those who do 
not share the former opinion. In other words, the respondents who find the income 
distribution improper are more than six times as likely to express preference for reducing 
income inequality as those who do not find it improper. This result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Introducing the variable Impr into model (1) results in enormous improvement 
in fit (G
2=249.32, df=1, p<0.001) which substantiates the theoretically predicted effect of 
impropriety on the stability of income distribution. 
Similarly, the effect of the support for the pro-market reforms is estimated to be -0.464 
which is to say that, other things being equal, those who believe the reforms were 
advantageous to most of the Polish society are e
-0.464=0.629 as likely to express the preference 
for reducing the income differences as those who do not accept that belief. In other words, 
this is to say that the support for the pro-market reforms reduces the odds of success by 37 per 
cent. Thus, consistent with Zelditch-Walker theory, the legitimacy is spread from one element 
of the social order (the institutional reforms) to another element that is seen as the former’s 
consequence (the rule of income distribution and its properties). The support for the reforms 
improves the fit of the model substantively (G
2=257.94, df=1, p<0.001). 
Self-interest also behaves in a theoretically predicted manner. The estimate of its 
effects is equal to -0.491 which means that the odds of success among those who benefited 
from the reforms are e
-0.491=0.612 times the odds of success among those who did not benefit 
from the reforms. Put other way, self-interest reduces the odds of preference for reducing the 
income differences by nearly 39 per cent. The improvement in fit resulting from adding this 
variable to the model is impressive (G
2=60.71, df=1, p<0.001). For those who are not familiar with odds or logits, a simpler interpretation of the 
effects of the model’s variables is available. This interpretation uses predicted proportions of 
successes. Specifically, difference of proportions is computed for subjects who are different in 
terms of a given independent variable, while other explanatory factors are kept constant. Let 
us denote by P(Y=1|X=x1) the probability of the occurrence of success at the level x1 of the 
explanatory variable and let P(Y=1|X=x0) denote the probability of success at the level x0 of X. 
In this notation, we assume that all other variables in the model are kept constant. Then, the 
difference P(Y=1|X=x1)-P(Y=1|X=x0) tells us how much the probability of success changes 
when we move from x1 to x0 along the focal variable, while keeping the other variables at 
fixed levels.
8  
To give an example, let P(Y=1|Impr=1) mean the probability of success — that is, of 
thinking that the government should reduce the income differences — among the subjects 
who find the income distribution in Poland improper and let P(Y=1|Impr=0) be the same 
probability for the subjects who do not find the distribution improper. Then, the difference 
P(Y=1|Impr=1)-P(Y=1|Impr=0) tells us how much the two groups of respondents differ in the 
probability of replying that the government should reduce the differences in income, given all 
the other explanatory variables are at their fixed levels. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, then the 
difference in question should be positive, as the preference for reduction of income inequality 
is predicted to occur more often in the former group than in the latter. According to the 
numbers in Table 5, the difference between the groups of respondents is equal to 0.147 and is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level, which corroborates the hypothesis.  
Similarly, P(Y=1|Support=0) is the probability of saying that the government should 
reduce the income differences given the lack of support for the 1989 reforms and 
P(Y=1|Support=1) is the analogous probability given the support for the reforms. Thus, 
P(Y=1|Support=0)-P(Y=1|Support=1) would be the difference in proportions of success 
between two groups of subjects: one that does not support the economic reforms set out in 
1989 and one that does, provided that the two groups are equal with respect to all other 
variables. In line with Hypothesis 5, this difference is expected to be positive and the figures 
in Table 5 are consistent with this prediction, with the expected value of the difference equal 
to 0.022 and statistically significant at the level of 0.05.  
                                                 
8 The difference in proportions are estimated using function sim() in the package Zelig of the 
R environment (Imai, King, and Lau, 2010: 44-6). The function simulates various quantities 
of interest — difference of proportions, in our case — from the estimated model output, given 
specified values of explanatory variables. The numbers in Table 5 are based on 1,000 
simulations. By the same token, let P(Y=1|Self=0)-P(Y=1|Self=1) denote the difference in 
proportions of success between two groups of respondents: one viewing the changes initiated 
in 1989 as being rather disadvantageous than advantageous to them personally and the other 
thinking the opposite. On the basis of Hypothesis 4, this quantity is predicted to be positive as 
the former group, unlike the latter, is expected to have no vested interest in supporting the 
status quo in the way income is distributed in Poland. Once again, the numbers shown in 
Table 5 turn out to be consistent with the theoretically derived prediction. 
Finally, let us have a look at the effects of the variable year. Recall that no specific 
hypotheses regarding this variable have been proposed and I added it to the model as a control 
to see if there were any ‘time effects’ regarding the preferences for change vs. status quo in 
the income distribution in Poland. According to the figures in Table 4, other things being 
equal, participation in a later edition of the PGSS results in a greater likelihood of replying 
that the government should, rather than shouldn’t, reduce the income differences than 
participation in the 1997 edition (a reference category), although the change from 1997 to 
1999 is not statistically significant. To illustrate, the participants in the 2002 edition were 
e
0.622=1.863 as likely to express preference for reducing the income differences as the 
respondents in 1997. In turn, the numbers in Table 5 tell the differences in proportions of 
successes between participants in consecutive editions of the Survey. That is, let 
P(Y=1|Year=1999)-P(Y=1|Year=1997) mean the difference of proportions of successes 
between the subjects in 1999 and those in 1997 when all the other factors are kept constant. 
As we can see, this difference is not statistically significantly different from 0, so we have not 
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (in the statistical sense) that the PGSS 
respondents in 1997 differ from those in 1999 in regard to preference for reducing the income 
differences. In general, the results reported in Table 5 imply that there two significant changes 
in the period covered by the analysis: from 1999 to 2002 and from 2005 to 2008. Thus, mean 
preference for status quo in the income distribution declines with time. Adding the variable 
year to the model leads to a significant improvement in fit (G
2=113.69, df=4, p<0.001). 
Fitting model II: the effects of validity and attribution of 
responsibility for injustice 
In this section, data from the 1999 PGSS edition are taken to estimate the following 
model:  
()
()
) 2 ( , Im
1 1
1
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= −
=
Self Support pr Attr Valid
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 where Valid means the indicator of the validity of the income distribution, and Attr stands for 
the indicator of the attribution of responsibility for the injustice; the remaining terms in 
equation (2) are interpreted as previously.  
Model (2) is more general than model (1) in that it incorporates more substantively 
interpreted variables, but less general in that it can be fitted to data collected at a single point 
in time. Recall that the indicators of validity and attribution of responsibility for injustice are 
based on items taken from the ISSP module on Social Inequality that was fielded in 1992 and 
1999. As explained before, the former edition was excluded from the scope of this analysis. 
As for the 1999 data, one should keep in mind that the sample size was 2,282, but the two 
items of interest — ‘Income differences are necessary for Poland’s future prosperity’ and 
‘Inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and powerful’ — were given to a 
randomly selected sub-sample comprising 1,135 individuals. Of these, 407 were deleted 
because of missingness, so the number of cases used to evaluate model (2) is equal to 728. 
Table 6 shows the effects of the estimation. Specifically, the table reports estimates of 
the coefficients for independent variables in equation (2) rather than expected differences in 
proportions of success. In the preceding sub-section, interpretation of the effects of 
independent variables in the logistic-regression analysis was presented in detail, the attention 
here is limited to a ‘qualitative’ presentation of the results. Also, as previously, only the 
coefficients for the substantive variables are shown, while the ones for controls are omitted in 
this discussion.  
As one can see from Table 6, both validity and attribution of responsibility for 
injustice have hypothesised and statistically significant effects on the dependent variable. 
More specifically, those who believe that income differences are necessary for Poland’s 
future prosperity are less likely to express the preference for the reduction of income 
inequality, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, and those who attribute the unfair level of income 
inequality to deliberate action by the rich and powerful are more likely to express this 
preference, consistent with Hypothesis 4. The results regarding the remaining variables 
reported in Table 6 are somewhat puzzling. While their estimates are in the hypothesised 
direction, they are not statistically significant. That is, we do not have enough evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis (in the statistical sense) that the coefficients for the variables are not 
different from zero. Also, a look at how individual variables contribute to improvement in fit 
of the model (see Table 7) leads to a similar conclusion. The reduction of the value of the 
likelihood-ratio statistic G
2 is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the case of validity 
and attribution of responsibility, but introducing impropriety, self-interest and the support for 1989 reforms does not lead to a significant improvement in fit. However, even if these results 
are inconsistent with the relevant hypotheses formulated above, they can still be reconciled 
with Zelditch-Walker legitimacy theory. 
First, that impropriety has no significant effect on the preference for reduction in the 
amount of inequality in the presence of validity agrees with the notion that while both validity 
and impropriety are predicted to have an effect on the stability of a social structure, it is 
validity which is more important of the two (Walker and Zelditch, 1993; Zelditch, 2006; 
Zelditch and Walker, 1984). Second, when it comes to the estimate of the effect of support for 
the 1989 market reforms, the following explanation can be assumed. If a person believes that 
the reforms were advantageous for most of the Polish society, he or she is likely to think that 
the consequences of these reforms are accepted by the majority as well. Now, if the person 
thinks that the increase in inequality is accepted by most of the others, he or she is likely to 
view the inequality as collectively validated. In other words, it is conjectured that the 
operationalisation of the spread of legitimacy in terms of the support for the 1989 reforms 
may have been invalid (in the measurement sense), as the measure can be said to constitute 
another instance of the concept of validity of the income distribution.  
Also, Walker and Zelditch distinguish in their theory between ‘endorsement’ and 
‘authority’ as separate sources of support for a collectively validated social order. The order is 
said to be endorsed when it is supported by ‘the masses’ and it’s said to be authorised when 
it’s supported by ‘the authorities’. From this point of view, the support for the reforms may be 
seen as an indicator of endorsement, rather than the spread of legitimacy, and the reason why 
the estimate of its effect is statistically insignificant is that, according to legitimacy theory, 
endorsement influences stability of a social structure indirectly — through its effect on 
validity. 
 This interpretation can be enhanced by another argument, also based on Zelditch-
Walker legitimacy theory. One of the conditions of legitimacy of a social order is consensus 
(Zelditch and Floyd, 1998; Zelditch and Walker, 2003). That is, an element of the social order 
is legitimated if it is consensually accepted. Thus, if the reforms are seen as advantageous for 
the majority, consensus is likely to arise about the legitimacy of the reforms and their 
consequences. Either way, the conclusion here is that the support for the reforms seems to be 
implicated in the conditions of validity of the income distribution and an appropriate model 
should include a direct effect of this variable on validity rather than on the stability of the 
distribution. This implication is left for future work.  The effects of self-interest can be explicated along more or less these same lines. The 
impact of self-interest on attempts to change a communication structure of a group was 
studied in an experiment testing the impartiality hypothesis (Zelditch, Gilliland, and Thomas, 
1984). The hypothesis claims that if a ‘formula’ which legitimates a social order appeals to 
some benefit, the order becomes legitimated only if the benefit is in the interest of all in the 
group or, if it’s not in the interests of all, it can be made universal (Zelditch and Walker, 
2003: 223). If, on the other hand, the benefit can be shown to be in the interest of some and 
not the others, then the formula cannot be used to validate the social order. Consequently, if a 
participant in the PGSS indicates that he or she believes the changes initiated in 1989 were 
advantageous for him or her personally, but not others in the society, this assessment can 
undermine the person’s belief in the legitimacy of inequality in Poland.
9 One implication of 
this conjecture is that adding an interaction term Support × Self to the model would work in 
the sense that it would improve the model’s fit substantially and would yield statistically 
significant estimates of the effects of the variables in question. The results of fitting a model 
including this interaction term suggest, however, that this conjecture is incorrect 
( ) 849 . 0 , 191 . 0 , 903 . 0 SE , 172 . 0 ˆ
ˆ = − = = − = p t
β β . A second implication is that instead of 
investigating a direct effect of the variable Self and its interaction with the variable Support on 
the dependent variable an indirect effect should be studied by introducing to the model main 
effects of these variables on validity of the income distribution in Poland. This latter 
suggestion is left for future work, too. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
Research reported in this paper was designed to test a number of theoretically derived 
hypotheses in order to be able to make conclusions regarding patterns of preference for 
reducing income differences in Poland as a measure of instability of the distribution of 
income. In general, results of the research can be said to confirm the hypotheses, although the 
confirmation is not without qualification. First, validity, as conceptualised by Zelditch-Walker 
                                                 
9 Note that this hypothesis contradicts that proposed within justice theory. According to 
justice theory, self-interest can colour justice evaluations in the sense that a distribution rule 
which is consistent with one interests will come to be seen as fair and rule which is 
inconsistent with one interest will come to be seen as unfair by the person in question. In turn, 
Zelditch and Walker legitimacy theory implies that self-interest can undermine the belief in 
the legitimacy of the distribution rule. It would be interesting to test the former implication 
against the latter in some future research. legitimacy theory (Zelditch and Walker, 1984), turns out to have the theoretically predicted 
and statistically significant effect on the stability of income distribution — subjects who 
believe that income differences are functional for an important societal goal are more likely to 
accept the differences than subjects who do not share that belief, regardless of whether or not 
they personally find the differences proper. Second, attribution of responsibility for injustice 
also has the predicted effect on the stability — subjects who blame the unfair increase in 
inequality on ‘the rich and powerful’, who are thought to benefit from the inequality, 
presumably at the cost to other groups in the society, are less willing to accept the existing 
differences in income than those who do not attribute the unfair increase in inequality to the 
privileged groups in the society. Note that the former conclusion is consistent with legitimacy 
theory (see especially Zelditch and Walker, 1984) and the latter with distributive-justice 
theory (see especially Utne and Kidd, 1980). As for the hypothesis concerning the effects of 
impropriety, it has been partially confirmed — partially in the sense that impropriety has 
turned out to behave in the predicted manner only in the absence of validity. Put differently, 
impropriety contributes to instability, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, by elevating the odds of 
occurrence of preference for reducing inequality in the distribution of earned income, but that 
effect is statistically significant only when validity is absent. This finding can still be viewed 
as consistent with legitimacy theory, as it claims that validity is more important for stability 
than impropriety (Zelditch, 2006; Zelditch and Walker, 1984). Finally, the hypotheses on the 
effects of self-interest and the support for the 1989 market reforms have received only partial 
confirmation as well. The conjecture here is that the partial confirmation is largely due to 
inadequate specification of the statistical model used to test the hypotheses and it is proposed 
that future research should test them using more refined models. Future research should also 
seek to develop more complex indicators of the theoretical concepts, perhaps by proposing 
multiple items, rather than one, to capture empirically the concepts, and allowing thereby for 
performing analyses of reliability and validity (in the measurement sense) of the indicators. 
In spite of all these qualifications, an important advantage of the present research is 
that it is an attempt to explain certain social processes, taking place in a concrete political, 
economic, and historical reality, in terms of general theoretical principles, that had been 
rigorously tested empirically, rather than idiosyncratic notions, specific to times and groups 
being studied. The use of such idiosyncratic notions in sociological analyses shifts focus from 
important similarities to superficial differences between cases being studied. Therefore, the 
general theoretical frameworks are especially useful in cross-national comparisons. Consequently, further analyses of legitimacy and stability of income distributions should be 
carried out in such a cross-national context. References 
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Table 1 Inequality in the monthly wages of Polish employees, 1987-2006 
Time  point Gini Time  point Gini 
September 1987 0.230 September 1997 0.303
September 1988 0.213 October 1998  0.294
September 1989 0.205 October 1999  0.306
September 1990 0.224 October 2000  0.310
September 1991 0.242 October 2001  0.314
September 1992 0.247 October 2002  0.327
September 1993 0.246 October 2003  0.332
September 1994 0.282 October 2004  0.336
September 1995 0.291 October 2005  0.339
September 1996 0.298 October 2006  0.343
Source: Kumor (2009: 13-14) 
 
Table 2 Attitudes towards inequality: Are income differences too large? 
Year  Strongly agree  Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree  Don’t know
1992 39.78 41.00  5.53  6.92  1.04  5.74 
1993 40.87 41.96  4.25  9.29  1.23  2.40 
1994 39.11 44.84  5.07  7.64  1.24  2.09 
1995 38.83 41.88  6.37  8.67  0.81  3.44 
1997 45.10 39.83  6.91  4.78  0.84  2.53 
1999 45.09 41.58  6.06  3.78  0.83  2.65 
2002 62.16 29.73  3.02  3.10  0.61  1.37 
2005 56.86 32.21  2.84  5.30  0.83  1.97 
2008 62.47 28.50  4.25  3.04  0.51  1.2 
Source: Polish General Social Surveys, 1992-2008 
 
Table 3 Sample sizes and completion rates in the Polish General Social Surveys, 1992-2008 
   Completion  rates 
PGSS edition  Size of the selected sample Frequency Percentage 
1992 2,000  1,647  82.4 
1993 2,000  1,649  82.5 
1994 2,000  1,609  80.5 
1995 2,000  1,603  80.2 
1997 3,200  2,402  75.1 
1999 3,406  2,282  67.0 
2002 4,008  2,473  61.7 
2005 2,106  1,277  60.6 
2008 2,495  1,293  51.8 
Total 23,215  16,234  69.9 
Source: Cichomski, Jerzyński, and Zieliński, 2009b: 10 
  
Table 4 Estimates of the explanatory factors in model (1) 
Variable Estimate  Std.  error  t-test  P(>|t|) 
Impropriety 1.807  0.127  14.221  0.00 
Support -0.464  0.126  -3.679  0.00 
Self -0.491  0.129  -3.818  0.00 
Year        
1999  0.106 0.149  0.706  0.48 
2002  0.622 0.127  4.886  0.00 
2005  0.615 0.150  4.106  0.00 
2008  1.070 0.158  6.786  0.00 
Intercept 0.617  0.514  1.199  0.23 
Note: Sample size N=9,726. 3,898 observations were deleted due to missingness 
 
Table 5 Differences in proportions of successes conditional on the values of the explanatory variables 
     95%  confidence  intervals
a 
Variable Mean
a Std.  deviation
a Lower bound Upper bound 
Impropriety 0.147  0.055  0.06  0.278 
Support 0.022  0.112  0.006  0.051 
Self 0.023  0.012  0.006  0.054 
Year       
1999/1997  0.006 0.011  -0.013  0.03 
2002/1999  0.027 0.015  0.007  0.064 
2005/2002  -0.001 0.007  -0.017  0.013 
2008/2005  0.016 0.010  0.002  0.039 
a See footnote 8 for details 
 
Table 6 Estimates of the effects of the explanatory factors in model (2) 
Variable Estimate  Std.  error  t-test  P(>|t|) 
Validity -1.043 0.321  -3.253  0.00 
Attribution 1.244  0.331 3.761  0.00 
Impropriety 0.724  0.459 1.578  0.12 
Support -0.353 0.461  -0.765  0.45 
Self -0.432  0.435  -0.993  0.32 
Note: Sample size N=1,135. 407 observations deleted due to missingness 
  
Table 7 Analysis of deviance for model (2) 
Variable  df  Deviance Residual df Residual Deviance 
Null     727  748.94 
Industry 27 79.95  700  668.99 
Sector of economy  10 11.94  690  657.05 
Region 7  6.09  683  650.96 
Size of the town of residence 7  51.30  676  599.66 
Household income  1  29.02  675  570.64 
Social-occupational category 5  2.98  670  567.66 
Degree of education  4  25.20  666  542.46 
Gender 1  9.90  665  532.56 
Age 1  10.79  664  521.77 
Attribution of responsibility  1  38.41  663  483.36 
Validity 1  17.75  662  465.61 
Impropriety 1  2.79  661  462.83 
Self-interest 1  3.73  660  459.10 
Support for the reforms  1  0.99  659  458.10 
Note: Terms added sequentially (first to last) 
 